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The PLA Airborne Corps in a Joint Island Landing Campaign
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Summary
The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Airborne Corps would likely play an important role in a crossstrait invasion through operations behind enemy lines. During the landing campaign, the Corps
would conduct paradrops or landing operations onto Taiwan, facilitated by PLA Air Force (PLAAF)
aircraft. Once on island, airborne forces would seize and hold terrain and conduct a variety of
operations to support the broader invasion. In recent years, the Corps has reorganized to improve its
capability for mechanized maneuver and assault, leveraging the PLAAF’s larger inventories of
transport aircraft, particularly the Y-20; improved the sophistication of its training at home; and
gleaned insights from abroad via training with foreign militaries. Nevertheless, it is uncertain to what
extent the Corps is able to overcome key challenges relevant to a cross-strait campaign. These
include ensuring effective integration with similar ground force and marine units; carrying out
operations in complex or degraded environments; transcending the Corps’ lack of relevant combat
experience; and obtaining adequate air support.
Introduction
In May 2018, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) announced a major new milestone for its
Airborne Corps (空降兵): Chinese paratroopers made their inaugural jump from the Y-20, the
country’s first indigenously-built aircraft in its strategic airlift fleet. In the same exercise, the Corps,
which is part of the PLA Air Force (PLAAF), completed its first heavy equipment drop from the new
aircraft—marking another important achievement in its modernization.1
Despite these developments and other recent modernization efforts underway within the airborne
forces, the Airborne Corps’ potential role in a cross-strait invasion has received relatively little
attention compared to the development of key ground and naval invasion forces.2 Lack of focus in
the past on the capability of airborne units may stem from the extreme capacity limitations of the
PLA’s strategic airlift forces, which restricted the PLA’s ability to deploy significant quantities of
airborne troops across the strait. However, the 2018 exercise and other recent milestones presage a
potentially much more active and significant role for the Airborne Corps in future cross-strait
operations.
In recent years, the PLA Airborne Corps has undergone significant reorganization and modernization
to improve capabilities relevant for cross-strait operations. The Corps also appears to be increasing
its training on complex topics, including in combined arms and joint contexts. However, like the
PLA writ large and the PLAAF in particular, the Airborne Corps suffers from a lack of combat
experience. It has not conducted combat operations abroad, but rather has been tasked to support the
regime during periods of domestic turmoil or for domestic humanitarian assistance and disaster relief
(HA/DR) operations. Key questions also remain regarding the Corps’ ability to integrate with other

Huang Panyue, ed., “Paratroops Jump Out of Y-20 Transport Aircraft,” China Military Online, May 10, 2018,
http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/view/2018-05/10/content_8028273.htm; Li Qiang, “Y-20’s Completion of First Heavy
Equipment Airdrop is of Great Significance,” China Military Online, June 12, 2018,
http://english.pladaily.com.cn/view/2018-06/12/content_8059912.htm.
2
A notable exception is Roderick Lee, “The PLA Airborne Corps in a Taiwan Scenario,” forthcoming from National
Defense University. On ground and naval forces’ role in an invasion, see, for example, Eric Heginbotham, Michael Nixon,
Forrest E. Morgan, Jacob L. Heim, Jeff Hagen, Sheng Tao Li, Jeffrey Engstrom, Martin C. Libicki, Paul DeLuca, David
A. Shlapak, David R. Frelinger, Burgess Laird, Kyle Brady, and Lyle J. Morris, The U.S.-China Military Scorecard:
Forces, Geography, and the Evolving Balance of Power, 1996–2017 (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2015),
https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR392.html.
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PLA units and conduct operations in complex or degraded environments, as well as the PLAAF’s
broader ability to secure the command of the air needed to enable airborne troops to land on Taiwan.
This report chronicles the changing capabilities of the PLA Airborne Corps over the past decade and
provides a foundation for assessing the Corps’ role in a cross-strait invasion. It comprises four main
sections. Section one briefly summarizes the force structure of the Corps. Section two reviews the
Airborne Corps’ stated roles and missions in a joint island landing campaign. Section three examines
recent efforts to strengthen the Corps’ ability to conduct operations relevant to a cross-strait invasion.
Section four discusses ongoing challenges that the PLA Airborne Corps must overcome to effectively
perform large-scale operations of this kind. The report concludes with a summary of main findings
and a roadmap for future research on this topic.

Exhibit 1. Chinese paratroopers prepare to board a PLAAF Y-20 transport aircraft (May 2018).3

History and Force Structure
Unlike the U.S. Armed Forces, the Airborne Corps has always been subordinate to the PLAAF rather
than the PLA ground forces. The Airborne Corps traces its roots to 1950, with the Central Military
Commission’s establishment of an Air Force Marine Brigade. The unit underwent several changes
over the subsequent decade, successively becoming the Air Force Marine First Division, the
Paratroops Division, and the Airborne Division until it was finally restructured into a corps-level
organization. Table 1 lists key organizational and operational milestones in the Corp’s development.

“Paratroopers Jump Out of a Y-20 Transport Aircraft,” China Military Online, May 10, 2018,
http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/view/2018-05/10/content_8028273_5.htm.
3
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Table 1. Key Events in the Airborne Corps’ Development4
Year(s)

Event

1950

The Central Military Commission (CMC) establishes an Air Force Marine brigade.

1961

Now known as the PLAAF 15th Airborne Corps, the unit’s headquarters is located in
Xiaogan, Hubei Province.

1967

The Corps deploys to Wuhan to subdue an uprising during the Cultural Revolution.

Mid-1970s

The Airborne Corps consists of three airborne divisions.

Mid-1980s

The Corps’ three divisions are reduced to three brigades.

1989

The Corps deploys to Beijing during the Tiananmen Square crisis and military crackdown.

1992

The Airborne Corps is officially designated a lead unit within the PLA’s rapid-reaction force
(快速反应部队), even though it had already been training in that role. 5

1993

The airborne brigades are upgraded to three divisions of about 10,000 troops each.

Mid-1990s

For the first time, the Airborne Force commander is selected as one of the PLAAF’s four
deputy commanders (1993), possibly reflecting increased leadership attention on the role of
airborne forces. The PLAAF also receives its first Il-76 transports.

2008

Airborne forces support earthquake relief efforts in Sichuan.

2017-2018

As part of broader PLA reforms, the Corps is renamed from the PLAAF 15 th Airborne Corps
to the PLA Airborne Corps, but remains part of the PLAAF. Its three division headquarters
are abolished and its six regiments are converted into brigades.

2020

The Airborne Corps supports COVID relief efforts in Wuhan.

Today, the Corps includes the following known units:
•

Six airborne combined-arms brigades (空降兵旅), consisting of three light motorized
brigades, two mechanized brigades, and one air assault brigade6

•

One transport aviation brigade (运输航空兵旅), which may include the pre-reorganization
helicopter regiment7

•

One special operations brigade (特种作战旅)

4

Adapted from Kenneth W. Allen and Cristina L. Garafola, 70 Years of the PLA Air Force (Montgomery, AL: China
Aerospace Studies Institute, 2021), 140,
https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/CASI/documents/Research/PLAAF/2021-0412%20CASI_70%20Years%20of%20the%20PLAAF_FINAL%20ALL.pdf?ver=hTom1CXAjt0VTGTJzJBGAQ%3d%3d
.
5
For more on the development of rapid reaction units and forces, see Dennis J. Blasko, The Chinese Army Today:
Tradition and Transformation for the 21 st Century (New York, NY: Routledge, 2012), 84-85, 104, 175.
6
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the
People’s Republic of China 2021 (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, November 2021), 58. The report notes that
each of these six brigades “typically commands four combined arms battalions (identified as either mechanized,
motorized, or assault), an artillery battalion, a reconnaissance and pathfinder battalion, an operations support battalion, a
service support battalion, and possibly a transportation battalion.”
7
Roderick Lee finds that one of the combined arms brigades has a helicopter regiment. Lee, “The PLA Airborne Corps in
a Taiwan Scenario.”
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•

One combat support brigade (作战支援旅)

•

One training base (训练基地)

•

One new training brigade (训练旅)8

Table 2 lists major equipment types in the PLA Airborne Corps’ order of battle. Table 3 provides the
PLAAF transport aircraft available to the force.
Table 2. PLA Airborne Corps Aircraft and Other Equipment9
TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT 40:
Medium: 6 Y-8
Light: 34: 20 Y-5; 2 Y-7; 12 Y-12D
HELICOPTERS
8 WZ-10K attack helicopters
8 Z-8KA combat search and rescue helicopters
12 Z-9WZ multi-role helicopters
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
180 ZBD-03 airborne combat vehicles
4 ZZZ-03 armored personnel carriers (command posts)
Modified CS/VN3 armored utility vehicles
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
Some self-propelled HJ-9
ARTILLERY 162+:
122mm towed: estimated 54 PL-96 (D-30)
107mm multiple-rocket launchers: estimated 54 PH-63
54+ mortars: some 82mm; 54 100mm
AIR DEFENCE
Point-defense SAMs: QW-1 (CH-SA-7)
25mm towed guns: 54 PG-87

8

Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the
People’s Republic of China 2019 (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, May 2019), 40; Lawrence Trevethan,
“‘Brigadization’” of the PLA Air Force,” China Aerospace Studies Institute, 2019, 6-7; Office of the Secretary of Defense,
Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2020
(Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, September 2020), 53; Allen and Garafola, 70 Years of the PLA Air Force,
140-141; Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2021,
58. For a detailed review of the Airborne Corps’ organizational structure, see Lee, “The PLA Airborne Corps in a Taiwan
Scenario.”
9
Adapted from The International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance (London: IISS, 2022), 260-263.
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Table 3. PLAAF Transport Units and Aircraft10
Units

Aircraft

1 regiment with Il-76MD/TD Candid
1 regiment with Il-76MD Candid; Il-78 Midas
1 regiment with Y-7
2 regiments with Y-9
2 regiments with Y-20/Y-20U

TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT 247+ total aircraft:
Heavy 51+: 20 Il-76MD/TD Candid; 31+ Y-20
Medium 55+: 30 Y-8C; 25+ Y-9
Light 111: 70 Y-5; 41 Y-7/Y-7H

One additional element of note in the Corps’ force structure is the CH-802 small drones operated by
the airborne brigades.11

The Role of the PLA Airborne Corps in a Cross-Strait Invasion
The 2006 Science of Campaigns summarizes the role of the Airborne Corps as follows: “Through air
mobility, the airborne force carries out operational activities in the enemy’s depth in order to achieve
specific strategic and campaign goals.”12 In the context of a cross-strait invasion, the Corps’ key role
would be to support a joint island landing campaign (JILC).13 Science of Campaigns cites three main
phases in a JILC: 1) preliminary operations; 2) assembly, embarkation, and transit; and 3) the assault
landing and the establishment of the campaign landing site (beachhead). Airborne forces would
likely participate in the first and third phases. During the preliminary phase, forces would be inserted
via airborne operations to conduct “sabotage raids” behind enemy lines to help the PLA seize
command of the air. Described as “elite special operations units,” these forces would target key
enemy airfield, radar, command and control, and munitions infrastructure.14
The Airborne Corps would also likely play a supporting role during the assault landing phase, when
the first echelon of the invasion, including both amphibious assault and vertical landing forces,
maneuver toward their objective areas.15 According to Science of Campaigns, this operation is
described as an airborne landing combined “with [a] frontal assault onto land… to assist and
complement landing force operations with active actions.”16 Airborne forces would then do the
following:
“[I]mmediately initiate attacks against predetermined targets, taking advantage of the
situation when the enemy’s state is unclear and they cannot organize effective resistance in
time and the counter-airborne landing units have not arrived, to quickly seize and occupy

10

Table 3 excludes VIP transport units operating personnel aircraft. The Y-8Cs listed in the aircraft count were previously
described as part of a mixed Y-8C/Y-20 regiment, but this is now listed as a Y-20-only unit. Military Balance 2022 lists
the new Y-20Us as tanker/transport aircraft, with three in inventory for 2022.
11
PLA Aerospace Power: A Primer on Trends in China’s Military Air, Space, and Missile Forces (Montgomery, AL:
China Aerospace Studies Institute, 2019), 2nd ed., 109,
https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/CASI/Books/Primer_2nd_Edition_Web_2019-07-30.pdf.
12
张玉良 [Zhang Yuliang], ed., 战役学 [Science of Campaigns] (Beijing: National Defense University Press, 2006), 589.
13

Ibid., 310-312.
It is not clear if these references are to airborne force-specific or SOF units in general. Ibid., 319-320.
15
Ibid., 327-329.
16
Ibid., 329.
14
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objectives, actively complement landing force operations, and accelerate the speed of the
assault onto land, ensuring that the assault onto land succeeds in one stroke.”17
Airborne forces are also expected to support the resistance against counterattacks that enemy forces
undertake against the PLA’s lodgment.18
The Science of Campaigns sheds light on how the PLAAF would likely approach a major airborne
campaign. It highlights four main elements. First, the PLA would need to seize information
superiority (制信息权) and command of the air (制空权). The text describes these as “preconditions”
(前提条件) for a successful airborne campaign.19 Second, the PLA would conduct preparatory fires
(火力准备). Third, the airborne troops would be transported, in this case across the Taiwan Strait,
and conduct paradrops or landings in selected locations. Once they had landed, the troops would
begin the campaign’s fourth phase: ground operations (地面作战). In this phase, they would capture
landing sites, set up PLA operations at the sites for follow-on landings, carry out ground offensives,
and transition to defensive operations as needed.20
As this sequence suggests, PLAAF aviation forces are a key enabler for the airborne campaign,
encompassing not only the transport units themselves but also aircraft that can seize command of the
air, target enemy forces in the landing area, and defend vulnerable cargo aircraft. Information is also
a key enabler of airborne operations—not only information regarding the enemy’s whereabouts, but
also the locations of other PLAAF and PLA unit movements to time airborne operations for
maximum effect. Maintaining that situational awareness becomes challenging once airborne units
land, and sustaining their combat power (which is relatively limited compared to regular ground
forces) is also difficult.21
Science of Campaigns details other attributes of airborne campaigns worth noting. First, it highlights
the use of deception during transport to confuse the adversary. Second, it calls for leveraging night
and poor weather for operations. Third, it recommends that airborne forces “strive to [move]… to the
target area using one single flight.” Last, it prescribes taking out vital links or targets once dropped or
landed, including suppressing enemy attacks.22

17

Ibid., 329.
Ibid., 329.
19
Ibid., 594-595.
20
Ibid., 589, 598-602.
21
Ibid., 593-594.
22
Ibid., 592.
18
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Exhibit 2. Chinese paratroopers jump from a Y-20 aircraft.23

Building New Capabilities Relevant for a Cross-Strait Invasion
The PLA Airborne Corps is building capabilities directly relevant to the roles it would likely play in
a cross-strait invasion. It is undergoing significant reorganization efforts to bolster its capability for
mechanized maneuver and assault, benefiting from growth in the PLA’s airlift capacity, increasing
training complexity, and learning from foreign outreach and training abroad.
Reorganizing to Improve Its Capability for Mechanized Maneuver and Assault
Over roughly the past decade, the Airborne Corps’ force structure for mechanized maneuver and
assault has grown. A 2011 PLA-linked source described the Corps of the mid-to-late 2000s as “a
lightly armed mode of ‘one person, one parachute, one gun,’ and light weapons with mortar.”24 One
U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) assessment likewise found that the pre-2018 reform Airborne
Corps was a “traditional motorized force” that emphasized parachuting operations.25 The Corps’
mechanized force structure developed during this period, with one of its three divisions featuring a
mechanized company that was later expanded to a battalion. This unit consisted of infantry fighting
vehicles capable of being dropped by parachute. Another division had a special operations group and
a small helicopter group (大队).26 This helicopter unit was established in 2005 and later expanded to
a regiment in 2012.27 Some reports indicate the Corps’ special operations group had also become a
“Paratroopers Jump Out of a Y-20 Transport Aircraft.”
Ian Burns McCaslin and Andrew S. Erickson, “Selling a Maritime Air Force: The PLA Air Force Campaign for a
Bigger Piece of the Maritime Domain,” China Aerospace Studies Institute, February 2019, 19, fn. 72,
https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/CASI/Books/CASI_Maritime_CAF_Web_Version.pdf.
25
Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2019, 40.
26
Blasko, The Chinese Army Today, 104.
27
PLA Aerospace Power, 25.
23
24
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regiment prior to the reforms.28 These airborne special operations forces were expected to conduct
reconnaissance operations, raids, sabotage, harassing attacks, and special technical attacks. 29
Following the broader trend of “brigadization” for PLA ground forces and some PLAAF units
(begun in 2015 and 2016), the Corps was reorganized in 2018 to integrate combined arms units at the
brigade level and therefore increase the Corps’ overall combat capability after arriving on the
battlefield. At least one brigade has also been outfitted with the ZBD-03 infantry fighting vehicle.
Mechanized equipment helps improve units’ combat power and maneuverability once on the ground,
potentially alleviating some of the challenges of post-landing operations that are identified in PLA
strategy texts.30

Exhibit 3. ZBD-03 airborne combat vehicles participate in a military parade.31

Leveraging Growing Airlift Capacity
Airlift capacity is repeatedly highlighted as a constraint facing the PLAAF, both in terms of enabling
activities such as PLA-wide operational maneuver, and as “an important mark of a strategic air force
more broadly,” especially in fielding high capacity, long-range transport aircraft. The 2013 Science
of Military Strategy states that “the PLA should … do everything possible to see that strategic air
transport capability realizes historic leaps within a short time span and ensures peacetime and
Xi Zhigang and Jiang Long, “In-depth: A Close Look at Chinese Airborne Troops,” China Military Online, August 30,
2017, link now broken but available at http://china-defense.blogspot.com/2017/09/in-depth-close-look-at-chineseairborne.html.
29
Blasko, The Chinese Army Today, 132.
30
For a detailed examination of the Airborne Corps’ mechanized forces, see Lee, “The PLA Airborne Corps in a Taiwan
Scenario.”
31
低可视涂装运-20 首次曝光 高调展示重装空投步战车 [“First Exposure of the Low-Visibility Coating on Y-20; HighProfile Display of Heavy Air-Dropped Infantry Fighting Vehicle”], 新浪军事 [Sina Military], August 13, 2021,
https://mil.news.sina.com.cn/china/2021-08-13/doc-ikqcfncc2678610.shtml.
28
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wartime ability to conduct long-range, rapid, large-scale air projection maneuver.”32 The 2020
Science of Military Strategy similarly calls on the PLAAF to continue to improve its airlift and
airborne capabilities.33
Consisting of small and medium transport aircraft, the PLA Airborne Corps’ organic aviation brigade
cannot adequately support the Corps’ mobility. Therefore, the force must rely on other PLAAF
medium and heavy transport and, potentially, search and rescue units to support large-scale
operations.34 Numbers of such aircraft have increased dramatically in recent years, directly benefiting
the Corps’ ability to rapidly deploy in a variety of scenarios.
DoD assesses that a related objective in the restructuring of the Corps “was to create a responsive and
streamlined airborne corps capable of air-delivering modular combat units—including aerial drop of
mechanized infantry forces.”35 These drops are most effectively accomplished with large transport
aircraft, which until the past few years have been a significant capacity gap for the PLAAF. A 2017
RAND study found that the small number of heavy transport aircraft available prior to 2016,
probably no more than two dozen aging Il-76 aircraft in total, likely constrained the PLAAF’s ability
to rapidly deploy the Corps across the country to one airborne division at a given time, or only a third
of the Corps’ operational strength.36 However, the Y-20 indigenous transport aircraft was officially
delivered to operational units beginning in 2016, and its inventories have grown rapidly since then.
Total PLAAF inventories of heavy transport aircraft have more than doubled in the past five years,
with at least 31 new Y-20s outnumbering the 20 older Il-76s as of 2022.37 If China continues to build
and field Y-20s at similar rates over the next few years, this long-standing capacity constraint on
rapid deployment of the Corps could be effectively mitigated.

寿晓松 [Shou Xiaosong], ed., 战略学 [Science of Military Strategy] (Beijing: Academy of Military Science Press,
2013), 221.
33
肖天亮 [Xiao Tianliang], ed., 战略学 [Science of Military Strategy] (Beijing: National Defense University Press, 2020),
374-377.
34
Trevethan, “‘Brigadization’” of the PLA Air Force,” 26. The International Institute for Strategic Studies states that the
Corps’ transport brigade has Y-5, Y-7, Y-8, and Y-12 aircraft. The International Institute for Strategic Studies, The
Military Balance, 2022, 261. See also Lee, “The PLA Airborne Corps in a Taiwan Scenario.”
35
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the
People’s Republic of China 2018 (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, August 2018), 97; Annual Report to
Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2019, 86.
36
Cristina L. Garafola and Timothy R. Heath, The Chinese Air Force's First Steps Toward Becoming an Expeditionary Air
Force (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-2056-AF, 2017),
https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2056.html.
37
The International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance (London: IISS, 2021), 218, 232; The International
Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, 2022, 261.
32
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Exhibit 4. A Y-20 performs an equipment drop (August 2020).38

Improving the Sophistication of Training at Home
The Airborne Corps has made steady progress in its training over the past twenty years, with
particular focus on sophistication and realism since 2018. The Corps has incorporated more complex
topics into its training regimen, including training for nighttime operations; with greater numbers of
aircraft, troops, and equipment; in complex geographic and weather conditions; and with other PLA
and PLAAF forces. Some of these efforts are long-standing; the below list summarizes select training
activities within China’s borders from 2001 to 2010:
•

2001: Liberation 1 (解放一号), a joint exercise, took place with three operational phases and
nearly 100,000 troops; the training site was selected for its resemblance to Taiwan. Following
an information war, the second phase included a nighttime airborne landing in support of a
joint ocean crossing and amphibious landing exercise.39

•

2008: Airborne forces reportedly performed their first “integrated parachuting” of both troops
and heavy equipment.40

•

2009: Airborne Movement (空降机动) 2009 saw elements of all three airborne divisions
participate in a 20-day exercise, in what one Chinese source calls “the largest ever Chinese
airborne force trans-regional campaign mobility comprehensive training exercise.”41

•

2009: The Vanguard (前锋) 2009 joint exercise focused on ground and air force unit training,
featuring an exercise headquarters staffed by both ground and air force officers. Along with

王明亮 [Wang Mingliang], 空降兵为什么被称为“战略拳头” [“Why the Airborne Corps is Called a ‘Strategic Fist’”],
中国青年报 [China Youth Online], September 17, 2020, p. 8, http://zqb.cyol.com/html/202009/17/nw.D110000zgqnb_20200917_2-08.htm.
39
Blasko, The Chinese Army Today, 187.
40
McCaslin and Erickson, Selling a Maritime Air Force, 19, fn. 72.
41
Dennis J. Blasko, “PLA Exercises March Toward Trans-Regional Joint Training,” China Brief, November 4, 2009,
https://jamestown.org/program/pla-exercises-march-toward-trans-regional-joint-training/.
38
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the participation of airborne troops, helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft supported ground
operations during the exercises.42
•

2010: Paratroopers from the Corps conducted the PLA’s “first organic and large-scale
parachute drill” on the Tibetan Plateau, with over 600 troops dropped.43

More recent exercises continue this emphasis on increasing the complexity of training topics.
Following a 2014 adjustment to the PLA’s top military strategic guidance that placed increasing
emphasis on warfighting in the maritime domain, air force leaders have pushed for a greater PLAAF
role in overseas operations, including for the Airborne Corps.44 In 2017, an air transport brigade from
the airborne forces conducted “low-altitude, penetration tactical training” over an unfamiliar area of
open sea, which one China Aerospace Studies Institute report assessed was one of multiple recent
training activities to practice island airdrop operations.45
As mentioned in the introduction, in 2018 airborne troops completed their first jumps from the Y-20,
and the new transport aircraft completed its first heavy equipment drop.46 DoD also noted that during
the year, the Corps undertook training leveraging “long-range raid and airborne operations based on
actual war plans” as well as focusing on combat realism and staffs’ ability to conduct command and
control.47 One of these 2018 exercises included the Corps’ participation for the first time in Red
Sword (红剑), one of the PLAAF’s premier training “brands” conducted annually that emphasizes
force-on-force confrontation.48 In 2019, the PLA held a seminar in Beijing focused on integrating the
Corps into joint operations and improving other airborne training topics.49 Exercises in 2020 and
2021 saw the Corps perform a number of training events with Y-20 aircraft, including Y-20s
dropping equipment and paratroopers in August 2020, moving elements of a brigade along with Il-76
and Y-9 aircraft in September 2020, and conducting day and night airborne training in April 2021.50
In 2020, the Corps also operated with a PLAN unit in a maritime environment, conducted oppositionforce training with PLAA units, and leveraged military and civilian logistics for rapid long-distance

Blasko, “PLA Exercises March Toward Trans-Regional Joint Training”; Blasko, The Chinese Army Today, 184-5.
Wang Haitao and Zhao Qigang, “Airborne Troops Realize Rapid High-Altitude Combat in Organic Unit,” PLA Daily,
August 13, 2010, link now broken but article reproduced at http://china-defense.blogspot.com/2010/08/15th-airbornecorps-conducts-large.html.
44
For more on PLAAF leaders’ increasing push for the air force to adopt a maritime role, see Mark R. Cozad and Nathan
Beauchamp-Mustafaga, People’s Liberation Army Air Force Operations over Water: Maintaining Relevance in China’s
Changing Security Environment (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2017),
https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2057.html; McCaslin and Erickson, Selling a Maritime Air Force; Allen
and Garafola, 70 Years of the PLA Air Force.
45
McCaslin and Erickson, Selling a Maritime Air Force, 19, citing Lu Xiaoping, The PLA Air Force (Beijing:
Intercontinental Press, 2011), 105; 尹闻博, 蒋龙 [Yi Wenbo and Jiang Long], 全域直达练就能降: 空降兵某航运旅对陌
生海岛目标实施模拟空降训练小记 [“Achieving Airdrop Capability Through All-Domain Direct Reach Operations: Air
Force Airborne’s Air Transport Brigade Carries Out Simulated Airdrop Over Unfamiliar Island Targets”], 空军报 [Air
Force Daily], June 7, 2017, 1.
46
Huang, “Paratroops Jump Out of Y-20 Transport Aircraft”; Li, “Y-20’s Completion of First Heavy Equipment Airdrop
is of Great Significance.”
47
Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2019, 23, 86.
48
Ibid., 23.
49
Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2020, 53.
50
“First Exposure of the Low-Visibility Coating on Y-20.”
42
43
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mobility.51 Many of these latest training milestones reflect focus on capabilities relevant to support a
future JILC.
Learning from Foreign Militaries
Airborne troops have trained with other militaries in China since 2005, and since 2011 they have
conducted overseas exercises with other militaries. These exercises have likely been in support of
PRC diplomacy as well as to gain a better understanding of counterparts’ tactics, techniques, and
procedures. The list below summarizes select training events during multilateral and bilateral
engagements:52
•

2005: For the first time, China’s airborne troops participated in an international exercise,
Peace Mission, though their paradrops took place in China. Russia also took part.

•

2007: Airborne troops jumped with Russian counterparts in Peace Mission in China.

•

2011: Airborne troops traveled to Belarus for their first overseas exercise, Divine Eagle.

•

2011: Airborne troops conducted a counterterrorism exercise, Cooperation, with Venezuela.

•

2013 and 2014: Airborne troops conducted two iterations of the Sharp Knife Airborne series
with Indonesian counterparts.

•

2014: Chinese airborne troops again joined the Peace Mission exercise in China.

•

2015: Airborne troops returned to Belarus for a second counterterrorism exercise.

•

2016 and 2017: A Chinese airborne platoon participated in a competition during the
International Army Games in 2016 (Russia) and 2017 (China). The platoon conducted jumps
with a helicopter.53

•

2017: During the Shaheen VI China-Pakistan Air Force combined training event, Chinese
airborne special forces troops and PLAAF and PLAN aircraft and ground units participated
alongside Pakistani counterparts.54

•

2018: Il-76 and Y-9 transport aircraft conducted low-altitude drops of troops and equipment
during the Aviadarts portion of the International Army Games in Russia.55

•

2019: Airborne troops represented the PLA for the first time in the small-scale survival
exercise Kowari, a trilateral exercise with the United States and Australia.56

•

2019: Units from a Corps brigade joined the Tsentr Russian-led multilateral exercise in
Russia. They reportedly performed paradrops and “airborne landing operations” with Russian
counterparts, although the degree to which these combined operations were truly integrated is
not known.57
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•

2020: Airborne troops participated in Airborne Platoon, a contest part of the International
Army Games in Russia, and operated using Russian infantry vehicles for the first time.58

•

2021: Airborne troops joined the Zapad/Western-Joint (西部·联合) exercise with Russia that
took place in China. One commentary stated that the PLA forces conducted “low-altitude
parachute landing of airborne troops at multiple altitudes, and mixed delivery of both
personnel and equipment for the army aviation and special operations forces” for the first
time.59

Some international exercises involving the PLA have provided significant learning opportunities for
Chinese airborne troops, at least as portrayed in PLA media. One 2017 article provides this anecdote
summarized by Western analysts: “One infantry fighting vehicle company commander in the PLA
airborne forces noted… that foreign forces strongly emphasized various forms of night training. The
commander compiled his knowledge and led his entire company in subject-based night training upon
his return to China” to improve the unit’s skills.60

Exhibit 5. Chinese paratroopers participate in “Zapad 2021.”61
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Key Questions Regarding Capabilities Needed for a Cross-Strait Invasion
Although advancements in Airborne Corps mechanization, airlift capacity, and training indicate the
force is improving its overall capabilities, key questions remain regarding the extent to which the
Corps has mastered the significant operational complexities required to effectively support a crossstrait invasion. While a detailed examination into these topics is beyond the scope of this report, key
issue areas are summarized below.
Unity of Effort? Integrating Operations by Similar Units
In order to operate most effectively, the PLA Airborne Corps must develop the ability to integrate its
operations with the PLA’s other airborne forces. The PLA Army (PLAA) and PLA Navy Marine
Corps (PLANMC) are also developing their own air assault units.62 SMS 2020 calls on the PLAA to
continue developing air landing and paradrops capability to help realize a three-dimensional Army,
along with Army aviation forces to form the backbone of the Army’s aerial assault strength.63 PLAA
air assault brigades equipped with helicopters can undertake “force projection and air insertion
missions,” and DoD notes that these PLAA air assault brigades can augment the Airborne Corps’
brigades for some types of operations.64 Recent training suggests that some level of PLAAF fixedwing airlift support to PLAA aviation and other units is already occurring. In summer 2021, Y-20
transport aircraft began training with the PLAA, including helicopter and special operations units.
One 2021 joint exercise involving a Xinjiang-based PLAA aviation brigade, PLAAF units, special
operations forces, and electronic countermeasure troops saw the transport aircraft moving groundbased support elements to the exercise and undertaking other unspecified operations.65 In the
maritime domain, PLAAF leaders are pursuing a growing array of overwater missions for air force
units, including “vertical amphibious landings” for the Corps, but the PLANMC also has this
capability.66 There is additionally potential overlap between the Airborne Corps’ special operations
brigade and airborne-qualified personnel in PLAA special operations and reconnaissance units.67
Like the PLAA aviation brigades, PLAA special operations units began conducting paradrops
training from the new Y-20 aircraft in 2021.68 Overall, it is likely that both PLAA air assault and
special operations forces along with PLANMC units have unique missions in support of combined
arms operations within the ground and naval forces. However, the extent to which airborne forces
and sister units in other services are able to coordinate directly or via higher headquarters in the event
of a contingency is not clear. Future research on this issue could survey the extent to which joint
training occurs among these units, as well as whether detailed reporting on their overall training
activities provides more information on areas of mission overlap.
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Operating in Complex or Degraded Conditions
Reporting on airborne forces’ training activities suggests the Corps is working to improve its
operational capabilities under complex or degraded conditions. PLA discussion of this topic tends to
focus on carrying out training in poor weather, harsh climates, or at night. During Peace Mission
2007, transport aircraft from China and Russia carried out paradrops and equipment drops during a
storm.69 In 2018, an airborne brigade air defense unit undertook a month-long opposition force
training drill in the mountains of Gansu Province, including nighttime training. 70 Other airborne
training discussions note an emphasis on precise timing and understanding of aircraft flight routes,
airdrop trajectories, and other information, such as for troop and equipment drops conducted as part
of the Peace Mission 2014 exercise.71 But whether airborne troops can adapt to degraded or missing
information is another question; the article on the 2014 exercise merely quoted a pilot as saying that
lacking precise information about those elements would lead to “mission failure.”72 Future research
on this training topic could examine the extent to which airborne forces are training under complex
electromagnetic or other conditions resulting in degraded information, as well as the extent to which
they encounter these training topics during opposition force training.
Lack of Relevant Experience
A third area of concern relates to the Corps’ lack of large-scale combat experience. The PLA writ
large experienced its last major combat operations during the 1979 invasion of Vietnam, and the
Corps’ sister branch, the PLAAF aviation forces, last fought during the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis
in 1958.73 However, all historical employment of China’s airborne forces has consisted of domestic
deployments during periods of internal upheaval in China. In 1967, airborne forces helped put down
a regional uprising in Wuhan during the Cultural Revolution, and they also deployed to Beijing in
1989 during the Tiananmen Square crisis and military crackdown.74
In addition to the Corps being untested in combat, domestic missions may potentially detract from its
combat capabilities. One China Aerospace Studies Institute assessment finds that a regime
preservation role may limit deployments to only a portion of the Corps’ end-strength: “it is unlikely
that more than four airborne brigades augmented” by special operations and combat support elements
“would participate in a single operation because of the requirement to have brigades available to
defend the regime.”75 In recent years, internal humanitarian assistance and disaster relief missions
have also resulted in deployments for airborne troops. Following the 2008 earthquake in Wenchuan,
Il-76 aircraft conducted airdrops from low altitude, while troops parachuted into the area to set up
communication channels.76 In 2020, airborne forces conducted COVID-19-related missions in
Wuhan.77 While major internal disaster relief missions may not occur frequently enough to detract
69
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from the Corps’ readiness and combat capabilities, future research could explore the extent to which
the Corps supports additional smaller-scale domestic missions, and whether PLA analysts assess
trade-offs for preparing for wartime missions.
Reliance on Aviation Forces
Finally, as a RAND review of PLAAF employment concepts noted, sufficient air support is a
requirement for successful airborne operations. Specifically, the PLAAF must suppress enemy air
defenses so that transport aircraft can ferry troops within close proximity to the landing zone.78 It
must also achieve command of the air. Once on the ground, airborne forces would likely still benefit
from some form of support from PLAAF aircraft as well as PLA logistics units, even if their organic
fires, mobility, and defensive capabilities are becoming more robust.79 Future research examining
this problem set more closely would need to assess the PLAAF’s ability to defend airborne packages
in contested environments, as well as its ability to surge and maintain high operational tempos to
support the specific windows required to execute cross-strait airborne operations.

Conclusions and Roadmap for Future Research
The Airborne Corps is expected to support a cross-strait invasion by penetrating behind enemy lines.
During the JILC, the Corps’ role would be to conduct paradrops or landing operations onto Taiwan,
facilitated by PLAAF aircraft. Once on island, airborne forces are expected to seize and hold terrain
and conduct a variety of operations that support the broader invasion. In recent years, the Corps has
reorganized to improve its capability for mechanized maneuver and assault, leveraging the PLAAF’s
larger inventories of transport aircraft, particularly the Y-20; improved the sophistication of its
training at home; and gleaned insights from abroad via training with foreign militaries, while also
supporting the CCP’s and PLA’s broader diplomacy efforts.
That said, key questions remain regarding the extent to which the Corps has solved potential
challenges to its ability to successfully conduct airborne operations. These include effectively
integrating with similar ground force and marine units, which have overlapping roles; carrying out
operations in complex or degraded environments; overcoming the Corps’ lack of relevant combat
experience; and delivering sufficient air support and successfully suppressing enemy fires to escort
vulnerable transport aircraft behind enemy lines.
To address these gaps, future research can identify the combined arms and joint exercises in which
the Corps participates and assess the frequency and complexity of those exercises. Changes to the
types of aircraft or helicopter forces from which they operate may provide indications of evolving
operational concepts. Also, overseas exchanges and training may offer additional insights into the
Corps’ evolving capabilities and focus areas for improvement.
Finally, while this report reviews substantial evidence that the PLA expects its airborne forces to
support cross-strait operations, some caution may be warranted.80 Historically, large-scale airborne
operations in highly contested environments resulted in significant casualties to airborne units. Risks
to airborne forces in modern warfare have only grown; capable opponents today can pose a wide
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array of threats to airborne forces, as well as to the transport aircraft supporting them.81 The
opportunity costs of deploying airborne forces into high-end conflict scenarios—particularly if air
dropped—may therefore be significant, given that transport aircraft can perform an array of other
valuable missions. While there is no indication that the PLA is radically rethinking roles for the
Airborne Corps, a 2020 commentary by a PLAAF Command Academy researcher took an expansive
view of the Corps’ future roles, describing the PLA’s airborne force as “strategic fists” that can not
only support major conflicts central to a country’s national security, but also to “defend national
interests and expand [the country’s] national security space on a global scale.”82 It is possible that the
PLA will increasingly seek to leverage airborne forces for a broader array of operations farther afield
and in less contested environments.
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